2015 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

12-18-2015

USA v. Dorothy Robinson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Dorothy Robinson" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1312.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1312

This December is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
Nos. 14-3875 & 15-1230

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DOROTHY ROBINSON,
also known as Mae-Mae
also known as Dorothy Johnson,
Dorothy Robinson,
Appellant
________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 4-07-cr-00389-010)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 7, 2015
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 18, 2015)
OPINION*
________________
AMBRO, Circuit Judge

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
*

Dorothy Robinson pled guilty to distribution of crack cocaine in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 860(a). In accord with the plea agreement, the District Court
sentenced her to 216 months’ imprisonment. Robinson now appeals the District Court’s
denial of her two pro se motions to reduce her sentence.1 However, her attorney, Carl
Poveromo, moves to withdraw as counsel under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), asserting that all potential grounds for appeal are frivolous. Robinson has not
filed a pro se brief in response. We affirm the District Court’s judgment and sentence
and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
I. Background
In August 2008, the Third Superseding Indictment charged Robinson with, among
other things, distribution of cocaine base (crack) to a confidential informant within 1,000
feet of public housing, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 860(a), and aiding and
abetting in the possession and distribution of crack cocaine within 1,000 feet of public
housing, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.
In September 2009, after a three-day trial, Robinson entered into a binding plea
agreement, per Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11(c)(1)(C), and pled guilty to only one count of
distribution of cocaine base (crack) to a confidential informant within 1,000 feet of public
housing. In the plea agreement, Robinson and the Government stipulated that she would
be sentenced to 216 months’ incarceration and a term of supervised release to be
determined by the District Court. Nothing in the plea agreement explained how the 216-

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
1
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month proposed sentence was determined nor indicated that it was based on the
Sentencing Guidelines in any way.
After the Court accepted Robinson’s plea, but before the sentencing hearing,
Robinson sent the Court two letters in which she asserted that she was coerced into
signing the plea agreement by both her attorney and her husband. The District Court
construed this to be a pro se motion to withdraw her guilty plea and, after hearing oral
argument, denied the motion.
At sentencing, the District Court adopted the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
(PSR), which determined Robinson possessed 19.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. The PSR
concluded that Robinson’s offense level was 43 and her criminal history category was II,
resulting in a Guidelines range of life imprisonment. However, because Robinson pled
guilty to an offense punishable by a maximum of 60 years, her Guidelines range was
capped at 720 months. In line with the binding plea agreement, the Court imposed a
sentence of 216 months followed by six years of supervised release.
Robinson appealed and we affirmed her sentence. See United States v. Robinson,
427 F. App’x 163 (3d Cir. 2011). She filed a pro se motion entitled “Retroactive
Application of Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines for the Fair Sentencing Act.”
Shortly after that motion was filed, the first court-appointed Federal Public Defender
moved to withdraw as counsel. The District Court granted counsel’s motion and shortly
thereafter denied without prejudice Robinson’s motion to reduce her sentence under
Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.
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In March 2012, Robinson filed another pro se document that the District Court
construed as a motion to reduce her sentence under Amendment 750. Robinson’s second
court-appointed Federal Public Defender moved to withdraw as counsel, concluding that
the Amendment did not apply because Robinson’s sentence was based on Rule
11(c)(1)(C), not the Guidelines. The District Court granted counsel’s motion and denied
Robinson’s motion to reduce her sentence. She followed with a motion to vacate her
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the District Court denied. Thereafter, Robinson
filed two motions for leave to file an untimely appeal, both of which the Court denied,
and in September 2013 we dismissed Robinson’s appeal of that decision for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.
In March 2014, Robinson filed a pro se motion to reduce her sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c), claiming Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), allowed
for a sentence reduction. The District Court denied the motion and Robinson filed a
timely pro se appeal.
In May 2014, Robinson filed with the District Court another pro se motion to
reduce her sentence under Amendment 750. The Court appointed a third Federal Public
Defender to represent Robinson, but the attorney moved for leave to withdraw as counsel
due to a potential conflict of interest. The Court permitted counsel to withdraw and
appointed Mr. Poveromo to represent Robinson. In January 2015, it denied Robinson’s
motion to reduce her sentence, and Robinson appeals.
We consolidated Robinson’s counseled appeal from the District Court’s denial of
her motion to reduce her sentence under Amendment 750, with her pro se appeal
4

challenging the District Court’s denial of her motion to reduce her sentence under
Rosemond. Mr. Poveromo now represents Robinson in both appeals.
As noted, Robinson’s appointed attorney moved to withdraw and filed a
corresponding Anders brief. Robinson was notified of her right to file a pro se brief, but
she has failed to do so.
II. Discussion
Under our rules, “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, counsel is
persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).
If we concur with counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders motion, and dispose
of the appeal without appointing new counsel.” Id. Accordingly, our “inquiry . . . is thus
twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether
an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v.
Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).
In his Anders brief, Robinson’s attorney addresses and rejects two potential issues
for appeal: (1) the District Court’s denial of Robinson’s motion for sentence reduction
under Amendment 750; and (2) its denial of her motion for a sentencing reduction under
Rosemond. Our review of the record confirms counsel’s assessment that there are no
nonfrivolous issues for appeal.
We review de novo a District Court's determination that a defendant is ineligible
for relief under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d 416, 420 (3d Cir.
2012). Robinson’s attorney states that the District Court properly denied the motion for
5

sentence reduction because Amendment 750 had no effect on the sentence. We agree.
Among other things, the Amendment altered the drug quantity table for crack cocaine in
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 and lowered the offense levels for crack cocaine. Under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10(c), these changes apply retroactively. To be entitled to a reduction of sentence,
however, “a defendant’s sentencing range must have been lowered by recalculation based
on the amended base offense level.” United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir.
2009) (emphasis in original).
The District Court correctly concluded that Amendment 750 had no effect on the
sentencing range in the Guidelines applicable to Robinson. Under the old version of the
Guidelines, the Court’s finding that Robinson was in possession of 19.5 kilograms of
crack cocaine resulted in a base level offense of 38, corresponding to the drug quantity
(“4.5 KG or more of Cocaine Base”) in the then-current § 2D1.1 table. U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c) (2008). Under the Guidelines as revised by Amendment 750, that finding
would have resulted in the same base offense level of 38, corresponding to the drug
quantity (“8.4 KG or more of Cocaine Base”). U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) (2011). Under both
versions of the Guidelines, Robinson’s total offense level was 43 and her criminal history
category was II, yielding, as noted, a Guidelines range of life imprisonment.
Moreover, as Robinson’s attorney points out, under Weatherspoon, Robinson is
not eligible for a sentence reduction because her Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement lacks
any indication that her 216-month sentence was based on the Guidelines. When the
District Court accepts a binding plea agreement, it is bound by the proposed sentence.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Under § 3582(c)(2), a district court has the authority to
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amend a sentence if it was based on a Guidelines range that has been lowered. A
defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is only
eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) if the sentence imposed pursuant to the
agreement is “based on” the applicable Guidelines range. Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d at 422
(quotation marks omitted).
The binding plea agreement before us does not specify the applicable advisory
Guidelines range or other information relevant to the calculation of that range, such as the
total offense level or Robinson’s criminal history category. It simply states the weight of
the cocaine base involved and provides that “[t]he parties agree that a sentence of 216
months incarceration . . . is a reasonable sentence.” App. at 134a. The only reference to
the Guidelines is a three-level reduction of offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
Therefore, the plea agreement “does not ‘make clear’ that the foundation of [the]
sentence was the Guidelines, because the agreement does not in any way identify or rely
on [the] Guidelines range.” Weatherspoon, 696 F.3d at 424.
On the second issue, we agree that the District Court properly denied Robinson’s
motion for a sentence reduction because Rosemond does not apply to her case. The
offense at issue in Rosemond was aiding and abetting an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense,
which includes using or carrying a firearm during or in relation to a violent crime or a
drug trafficking crime. The Supreme Court held that § 924(c) liability requires the
Government to prove that “the defendant actively participated in the underlying drug
trafficking or violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or
carry a gun during the crime’s commission.” Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1243.
7

Unlike the defendant in Rosemond, Robinson was never charged with aiding and
abetting the use or carrying of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence or drugtrafficking offense, in violation of § 924(c). Though she was charged with aiding and
abetting in the possession and distribution of crack cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2,
that charge was not included in the plea agreement. Instead, Robinson pled guilty as a
principal to possession and distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 860(a). Thus we find no error with the District Court’s conclusion that
Rosemond is not on point and agree with counsel that there is no appealable basis
presented to challenge Robinson’s sentence on this ground.
*

*

*

*

*

In sum, our independent review of the record convinces us that Robinson’s
counsel “has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable issues” and that each
potential issue identified is ultimately frivolous. United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778,
780 (3d Cir. 2000). We affirm Robinson’s sentence and grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
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